The Art of Violence and Justice 3

If you have not read at least the second post on The Art of Violence and Justice then please do so before reading this or you will be lost.

In answer to the first hypothetical scenario of my last post the prisoner would always be morally right in not killing the guards in his attempt to free himself. Such an individual would be a martyr of a sort. If the prisoner kills the guards then it is my belief that he does not become evil even with the fact that the guards are good individuals. The reason for this is when one does evil then one’s right to not have evil inflicted upon one in return is nullified. The guards, even unaware of this, have opened themselves up to the possibility of retaliation against themselves by their actions and choices i.e. holding an innocent man captive. The prisoner is, of course, taking his own chances in this moral system by escaping. In the guards’ reality the prisoner is the evil one forfeiting his right not to be harmed by what they believe he has done and by inflicting harm upon them in an escape attempt. So in the end no one is doing any wrong here as far as the prisoner and guards are concerned.

While I do not make the claim that killing is purely good in this instance of the guards and prisoner I do make the claim that it is morally acceptable or neutral. Killing in self-defense I should think would be viewed in much the same way as the defender does not likely enjoy having killed his/her attacker but deemed it as necessary to his/her wellbeing and in line with an individuals moral rights.

The essential rule of this moral system is demonstrated in the following example. Suppose one is attacked by another individual and that individual is intent on killing you. You would be on sound moral ground if you killed that individual. Now suppose that you had the option of instead of killing this individual in return to merely subdue him with a reasonably high chance of success say around 99.99%. By taking the action he has this attacker has forfeited his right to not be killed but the defender has the option of killing the attacker or sparing his life. So killing the attacker would be a neutral action because he has forfeited his moral rights but sparing his life would be a good action because it was not necessary but went a step further.

Acts considered evil in one instance and neutral or good in another lead us to the conclusion that it may possibly be that the end justifies the means. This is not supported at all as the moral system here is situational but also governed by a rule system. When one is committing evil acts one is morally open to them being inflicted upon oneself. While those acts may become neutral and forgiven in the end (or after the fact) when the results are clear the present shows them to be immoral and unjustifiable. It may be entirely up to moral luck as to whether or not the end result comes out as something good as well. So when one does evil one is essentially taking a gamble with one’s essence as to whether or not one is good or evil in existence and not just taking one single wrong action. This brings in the situational aspect. When one has other options it is inherently wrong to do evil therefore the ends do not justify the means as long as there are other means.

Now as to the second example the person involved is free. As such this individual has other options than to initially kill the guards and help the prisoner escape. Following this moral system the individual should exhaust all other means to free the prisoner before killing the guards. Though if all other means are exhausted then such an action would be acceptable.

These examples unlike in the original post of The Art of Violence and Justice do follow true justice as all actions happen merely to establish equity and give those wronged back what they had lost or were threatened with losing. The original post dealt with an example of a person without options other than vengeance and possibly vengeance with equity. I’m not entirely sure I made that distinction well but it was meant to be there as that individual was meant to be recouping loss rather than merely inflicting it back upon others.

I believe I have sufficiently answered these moral dilemmas and introduced the system of moral rights. I intend to go more in depth with this system in later posts.

The Art of Violence and Justice 2

In my previous post The Art of Violence and Justice I discussed a hypothetical scenario involving an individual who was in an irreconcilable situation from which there was no apparent escape without the use of violence. In the end of the line of thought I found that violence was unnecessary even in that airtight hypothetical situation. However, I also found that the individual was left with the options of defeat or committing illegal acts. Illegal was found not to be the same as immoral. I also wrote that even though this hypothetical situation did not pan out to leave the individual with a violent option as the only recourse to extricate one from one’s problems, it was conceivable that there were other situations in which one might be forced to do violence without having violence first done to oneself. Since writing that post I have continued to think on the subject and have come up with a couple more hypothetical situations.

The first situation is one in which an individual is falsely accused of murder, tried, convicted and imprisoned. The individual is not on death row as that would mean the possibility of violence would be visited upon him first and doing violence in self-defense to escape that would make a certain moral sense. The question in this case is if a person has a right to harm or kill others to secure one’s own freedom. Most specifically when one has done no wrong yet has been imprisoned. We’ll say that in this hypothetical society in which he exists he has no hope for an appeal or chance to be proven innocent and released. Suppose that this individual is held in a maximum security prison yet one day finds himself in a position with the chance to escape in a transfer to a new facility of equal security. The only problem is that to do so he would have to kill a couple of guards. In other words, he won’t get as lucky as Harrison Ford in The Fugitive and have them die of their own accord. This presents something of a paradox since in order to escape he must become a murderer even though he wasn’t a murderer to begin with. One might question whether or not killing these guards would be murder since they are in fact serving an immoral justice in keeping this individual imprisoned. But that begs the question of whether these guards are evil or not. It is not immoral to destroy evil so if the guards are evil then they may conceivably be killed without tarnishing one’s soul. It leaves the prisoner with having to judge the moral fiber of the guards. In this case, I will simplify the situation and say that one can be good and still serve evil though I think one would have to be almost totally deceived by it to do so. So the guards appear to be good individuals who have wives and go to see their children’s school plays. Our prisoner is not going to be able to get out of this one and still remain a good person. He is left with either suffering in his existence or becoming a murderer. Yet this again confuses our problem entirely because the individual is only seeking something good for himself and if anyone knew the truth of his predicament they would most surely seek his release. Yet we also are saying he cannot do it because by committing one (or two evil acts if you count it separate for the death of each guard) would make this individual evil. Maybe he escapes to a tropical island and has a pleasant existence for the rest of his days and isn’t caught during his escape attempt. It may very well be that after killing both guards the individual escapes and never kills/murders anyone ever again. So we are brought back to the problem of the guards committing evil acts without knowledge of doing so. We are working from the premise that one can be good even while one is or has in the past committed evil acts so that would mean that it is entirely possible our individual could still be a murderer and a good person. The other option is that acts matter and if you engage in certain ones then you are automatically evil. In the first case the individual could get away with murder because he isn’t evil though he might feel deep regret over doing so and in the other case he could kill the guards without pangs of conscience because they are evil by the fact they are committing evil acts. It seems that in this case violence is unavoidable save the individual taking upon himself another’s punishment till the time at which his dismal existence ends. This problem is deeply complex and I am unsatisfied with any of the options available.

The second situation is one in which an individual knows another is being held against his/her will yet to free him/her one would need to kill many innocent people. We’ll say there are guards at the prison who think this second person has committed murder. The guards are merely doing their jobs but they are undoubtedly committing an evil act by keeping this individual imprisoned. The free individual has a moral obligation to see that the other individual is not imprisoned against his/her will. Yet to carry out on that obligation one is forced to commit seemingly evil acts. As you can see we are left with the same quandary in this situation as the first one. The answer to these situations is in the distinction between evil acts and evil existences as well as good acts and good existences.

Finding the difference between these things is a complex task which I have set for myself. However, it is a vital question to morality and yes I have come to some conclusions about it. I ask that anyone who reads this thinks upon the problem of these hypothetical situations and once having given it some thought, then read my next post.